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HOW THE NEW DEAL BECAME A RAW DEAL FOR INDIAN 
NATIONS: JUSTICE STANLEY REED AND THE TEE-HIT-
TON DECISION ON INDIAN TITLE 
Kent McNeil* 
In 1955, the Supreme Court delivered one of the most regressive, and in 
some ways surprising, decisions it has ever made regarding Indian rights. 
The case, Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States,1 involved a claim to 
original Indian title to traditional lands by a small, but identifiable, 
subgroup of Tlingit Indians in Alaska. The group sought compensation 
from the United States government for the taking of timber from a portion 
of its lands located within the Tongass National Forest. Prior to the case, in 
1947, Congress authorized the sale of timber within the forest,2 and in 
                                                                                                                 
 * Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. The research assistance of 
Liza Bowman, Brent Arnold, Ryan Gibson, and Laura Achoneftos is very gratefully 
acknowledged, as is the helpful feedback of Kerry Wilkins. I would also like to express my 
appreciation to the very helpful staff at the Breckinridge Research Room, Margaret I. King 
Library, Special Collections, University of Kentucky, Lexington, where Justice Stanley 
Forman Reed’s papers are archived. 
 1. 348 U.S. 272 (1955). For background, see Stephen Haycox, Tee-Hit-Ton and Alaska 
Native Rights, in LAW FOR THE ELEPHANT, LAW FOR THE BEAVER: ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL 
HISTORY OF THE NORTH AMERICAN WEST 127 (John McLaren, Hamar Foster & Chet Orloff 
eds., 1992); DONALD CRAIG MITCHELL, SOLD AMERICAN: THE STORY OF ALASKA NATIVES 
AND THEIR LAND, 1867–1959, at 355–58 (1997); Joseph William Singer, Erasing Indian 
Country: The Story of Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 229 
(Carole Goldberg, Kevin K. Washburn & Philip P. Frickey eds., 2011). 
 2. H.R.J. Res. 205, 80th Cong. (1947), 62 Stat. 920; see Stephen W. Haycox, 
Economic Development and Indian Land Rights in Modern Alaska: The 1947 Tongass 
Timber Act, 21 W. HIST. Q. 20 (1990); DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY 
AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE 169–71 (1997). Felix S. Cohen, 
whose 1942 text, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, became a classic (for the latest edition, 
see infra note 42), published a forceful article criticizing this statute and the way it had been 
enacted. See Felix S. Cohen, Alaska’s Nuremberg Laws: Congress Sanctions Racial 
Discrimination, COMMENTARY, Aug. 1948, at 136, https://www.commentarymagazine.com/ 
articles/alaskas-nuremberg-lawscongress-sanctions-racial-discrimination/. In it, he wrote: 
For the first time in our history, it has been decreed by Congress that a 
government bureau may seize the possessions of Americans solely because 
they belong to a minority race. That is the meaning of the Tongass Act, which 
deprives Alaskans of their land and timber if two or more of their grandparents 
were Indians . . . . 
Id. at 136. Nor was Cohen alone in publicly criticizing the Act. He referred to similarly 
critical articles in Christian Century, the Catholic weekly Commonweal, and the Richmond 
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1951, the Secretary of Agriculture sold the timber from these lands to a 
private company. The Tee-Hit-Ton Indians claimed that they were entitled 
to just compensation for the taking of their property according to the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.3 
In a decision delivered by Justice Stanley Reed, the Supreme Court 
denied the Tribe’s claim. The decision is surprising because it contradicts 
earlier jurisprudence on Indian rights, especially Chief Justice Marshall’s 
decisions in Fletcher v. Peck,4 Johnson v. M’Intosh,5 and Worcester v. 
Georgia,6 all of which acknowledged the proprietary nature of original 
Indian title. If proprietary, it should be protected against government taking 
without just compensation. So why did the Supreme Court decide 
otherwise? This article seeks to answer this question by examining Justice 
Reed’s Indian rights opinions from the 1940s and demonstrating how he 
was able to persuade other members of the Court to accept his view that 
compensation for the taking of Indian lands should be left to Congress’s 
discretion. 
Justice Reed’s opinion on Indian law matters stemmed from his 
experience as President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Solicitor General in the 
mid-1930s. During that era, a conservative Supreme Court invoked 
constitutional provisions to strike down many of the administration’s New 
Deal legislative initiatives. After he was appointed to the Supreme Court by 
Roosevelt in 1937, Justice Reed expressed a preference for deference to 
government and for judicial restraint in the use of constitutional provisions 
to limit the authority of the legislative and executive branches. His decision 
in the Tee-Hit-Ton case applied this philosophy to the detriment of the 
Indian nations and the consistent development of federal Indian law. 
I. The Tee-Hit-Ton Judgment 
The Supreme Court decided that, if unrecognized by Congress, the rights 
of the Indian tribes to their traditional lands are not protected by the Fifth 
Amendment because they are not proprietary. Instead, they amount to a 
                                                                                                                 
Times-Dispatch. Id. at 138–39. Regrettably, Cohen died in 1953 at the young age of forty-six 
before the Court of Claims handed down the judgment in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United 
States, 120 F. Supp. 202 (Ct. Cl. 1954), that was affirmed by the Supreme Court. 
 3. Inter alia, the Fifth Amendment provides: “nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 4. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
 5. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
 6. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
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mere “right of occupancy” at the sufferance of American government. 
Justice Reed described this right of permissive occupation in this way: 
This is not a property right but amounts to a right of occupancy 
which the sovereign [the United States] grants and protects 
against intrusion by third parties but which right of occupancy 
may be terminated and such lands fully disposed of by the 
sovereign itself without any legally enforceable obligation to 
compensate the Indians.7 
Relying on the dubious historical supposition that “[e]very American 
schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this continent were deprived” of 
their lands, not by treaty, but by conquest,8 Reed concluded: 
In the light of the history of Indian relations in this Nation, no 
other course would meet the problem of the growth of the United 
States except to make congressional contributions for Indian 
lands rather than to subject the Government to an obligation to 
pay the value when taken with interest to the date of payment. 
Our conclusion does not uphold harshness as against tenderness 
toward the Indians, but it leaves with Congress, where it belongs, 
the policy of Indian gratuities for the termination of Indian 
occupancy of Government-owned land rather than making 
compensation for its value a rigid constitutional principle.9 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955).  
 8. Id. at 289–90. Reed was dismissive of the treaties as consensual cessions of land: 
“[E]ven when the Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in return for blankets, food and 
trinkets, it was not a sale but the conquerors’ will that deprived them of their land.” Id. at 
290; cf. Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 34–35 (1947) 
(describing what “[e]very American schoolboy is taught” as the “prevailing mythology”). 
The reality, Cohen wrote, is that “practically all of the real estate acquired by the United 
States since 1776 was purchased not from Napoleon or any other emperor or czar but from 
its original Indian owners.” Id. at 35. In a footnote to this passage, Cohen quotes Thomas 
Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, 1781-1785, in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON: 
CONTAINING HIS MAJOR WRITINGS, PUBLISHED AND UNPUBLISHED, EXCEPT HIS LETTERS 632 
(Saul K. Padover ed., Books for Libraries Press 1969) (1943) (“That the lands of this country 
were taken from them [the Indian tribes] by conquest, is not so general a truth as is 
supposed. I find in our historians and records, repeated proofs of purchase.”). See also Philip 
P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31, 31–33 (1996). 
 9. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 290–91 (emphasis added). It is worth noting that the first 
sentence in this quotation, which is a frank admission that the United States had to be able to 
take Indian lands without any legal obligation to pay for them in order to afford to expand, 
was not in an earlier draft of Reed’s judgment, dated January 21, 1955. It was added in 
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Reed was quite explicit about the policy grounds for his decision. He 
thought that Congress, rather than the courts, should have the authority to 
determine what compensation, if any, should be paid to the Indian nations 
when their right of occupancy was terminated. 
But to reach this conclusion, Justice Reed had to classify the Indian 
interest in their traditional lands as non-proprietary, that is, as not 
amounting to a property interest in land protected by the Fifth Amendment. 
How did he do this? First, he began with a very questionable interpretation 
of earlier Supreme Court cases, starting with Chief Justice Marshall’s 
celebrated decision in Johnson v. M’Intosh,10 which according to Reed, had 
held that Indian title is a non-proprietary right of occupancy. As Professor 
Nell Newton has so ably demonstrated in her article, “At the Whim of the 
Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered,”11 Reed’s interpretation of these 
decisions does not stand up to scrutiny. Well before Johnson, Marshall had 
held in Fletcher v. Peck “that the nature of the Indian title, which is 
certainly to be respected by all courts, until it be legitimately extinguished, 
is not such as to be absolutely repugnant to seisin in fee on the part of the 
state [of Georgia].”12 In other words, even though the state’s underlying 
title to the lands in question might be a fee simple estate, the Indian title 
was nonetheless a proprietary legal burden on it, for if it did not amount to a 
legal property interest courts would not have to respect it. Relying on 
Fletcher, Marshall stated in Johnson that Indian title would bar an 
ejectment brought to acquire possession by the holder of the fee simple just 
as effectively as a lease for years.13 For Chief Justice Marshall, this meant 
that a grantee who acquired the fee simple from the state would not be able 
                                                                                                                 
handwriting to that draft and included in the last paragraph of the January 24, 1955 
typescript. These drafts and other papers relating to the Tee-Hit-Ton case are in the 
University of Kentucky, Margaret I. King Library, Special Collections, Stanley Forman 
Reed Collection, 81M3, Box 159, Supreme Court Series, Opinions File, October Term 1954, 
Case No. 43, Tee-Hit-Ton Indians vs United States [hereinafter Reed Collection: Tee-Hit-
Ton Indians]. 
  10. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). Other cases relied on by Reed included Beecher v. 
Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517 (1877), and United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Co., 314 U.S. 
339 (1941). 
  11. Nell Jessup Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered, 
31 HASTINGS L.J. 1215 (1980); see also J. Youngblood Henderson, Unraveling the Riddle of 
Aboriginal Title, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 75 (1977); Steven John Bloxham, Aboriginal Title, 
Alaskan Native Property Rights, and the Case of the Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 8 AM. INDIAN L. 
REV. 299, 325–26 (1980); Singer, supra note 1, at 243–47. 
 12. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 142–43 (1810). 
 13. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 592. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol44/iss1/2
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to obtain possession until the Indian title had been legitimately extinguished 
by the United States.14 
In Johnson, Marshall opined that the colonizing European powers had 
agreed among themselves that “discovery” of new lands in North America 
gave the discovering nation sovereignty and the sole right to acquire Indian 
lands. Discovery did not, however, result in loss of the Indian nations’ 
rights to the lands they occupied and used. Marshall said that the Indians 
were “the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to 
retain possession of it, and use it according to their discretion.”15 He 
confirmed this idea in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia in 1831, stating that “the 
Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and, heretofore, 
unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be 
extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government.”16 A year later in 
Worcester v. Georgia, Marshall again affirmed the legal nature of Indian 
title, stating that “the Indian nations possessed a full right to the lands they 
occupied.”17 Commenting on the doctrine of discovery that he had relied on 
in Johnson to give European sovereigns, and subsequently the United 
States, the exclusive right to purchase lands from the Indians, Marshall 
wrote that it 
was an exclusive principle which shut out the right of 
competition among those who had agreed to it; not one which 
could annul the previous rights of those who had not agreed to it. 
It regulated the right given by discovery among the European 
discoverers, but could not affect the rights of those already in 
                                                                                                                 
 14. See also Beecher, 95 U.S. at 525. In Johnson, Marshall was answering the following 
question posed in Fletcher: “It was doubted whether a state can be seised in fee of lands, 
subject to the Indian title, and whether a decision that they [the states] were seised in fee, 
might not be construed to amount to a decision that their grantee might maintain an 
ejectment for them, notwithstanding that title.” Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 142. The term 
“ejectment” is used here in its legal sense to refer to the old action of ejectment, whereby a 
person with a better title could recover land from a person in possession. See KENT MCNEIL, 
COMMON LAW ABORIGINAL TITLE 38–63, 250–52 (1989). Likewise, the holders of Indian 
title could recover their land from a wrongdoer by an action of ejectment, demonstrating 
again the proprietary nature of their title. See Marsh v. Brooks, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 223, 232 
(1850); Cty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 105 S. Ct. 1245, 1252 (1985). 
 15. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574 (emphasis added). 
 16. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). 
 17. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560 (1832). 
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possession, either as aboriginal occupants, or as occupants by 
virtue of a discovery made before the memory of man.18 
So discovery by Europeans did not diminish the pre-existing sovereignty 
and land rights of the Indian nations. For that to happen, the lands had to be 
brought within the territorial jurisdiction of the discovering sovereign, 
which according to Johnson, could be accomplished by treaty or conquest.19 
Once that occurred, the Indians nonetheless retained internal sovereignty 
and ownership of lands not ceded to or taken by the European nation or, 
subsequently, the United States.20 
In the unanimous decision in Mitchel v. United States in 1835, Justice 
Baldwin reaffirmed the proprietary nature of the Indians’ title: 
[T]heir hunting grounds were as much in their actual possession 
as the cleared fields of the whites; and their rights to its 
exclusive enjoyment in their own way and for their own 
purposes were as much respected, until they abandoned them, 
made a cession to the government, or an authorized sale to 
individuals. . . . 
 . . . [I]t is enough to consider it as a settled principle, that their 
right of occupancy is considered as sacred as the fee simple of 
the whites.21 
To be as sacred as the fee simple, the most complete form of common law 
ownership, Indian title must be proprietary and enjoy the same kind of legal 
protection the common law has provided fee simple owners against 
government takings—protection the framers of the Fifth Amendment 
regarded as sufficiently important to add to the Constitution.22  
                                                                                                                 
 18. Id. at 544. 
 19. For further discussion, see Kent McNeil, Review Essay, The Doctrine of Discovery 
Reconsidered: Reflecting on Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of Discovery in 
the English Colonies, by Robert J. Miller, Jacinta Ruru, Larissa Behrendt, and Tracey 
Lindberg, and Reconciling Sovereignties: Aboriginal Nations and Canada, by Felix Hoehn, 
53 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 699 (2016). 
 20. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574, 593, 603; Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16–17; Worcester, 
31 U.S. at 542–44, 547, 553, 556–57, 559–61; Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 560–62 
(1883); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322–24 (1978); United States v. Lara, 541 
U.S. 193, 204–05 (2004). 
 21. 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835). 
 22. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129; HERBERT BROOM & GEORGE L. 
DENMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW VIEWED IN RELATION TO COMMON LAW 225–45 (London, 
W. Maxwell & Son, 2d ed. 1885) (1866); T.R.S. Allan, Legislative Supremacy and the Rule 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol44/iss1/2
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The Supreme Court has nonetheless held Congress has plenary power 
over the Indian nations and so can infringe upon their rights at any time.23 
In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,24 the Court decided that Congress could ignore a 
provision in an 1867 treaty between the Comanche and Kiowa tribes 
requiring that three-quarters of the adult males occupying their reservation 
had to consent to any cession of reservation lands. Justice White delivered 
the opinion of the Court, stating, “Plenary authority over the tribal relations 
of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the 
power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled 
by the judicial department of the government.”25 The Court held this 
plenary power includes power over tribal property.  
However, while Congress may have unfettered authority to take tribal 
lands, this does not mean it can do so without paying compensation. The 
issue of compensation was apparently not at issue in Lone Wolf because the 
statutes in question “purported to give an adequate consideration for the 
surplus lands not allotted among the Indians or reserved for their 
benefit.”26 But, if just compensation had not been provided, one would 
expect the Court to have ordered it be paid because the Court referred to the 
                                                                                                                 
of Law: Democracy and Constitutionalism, 44 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 111 (1985); JAMES W. ELY, 
JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY 
RIGHTS (2d ed. 1998); Singer, supra note 1, at 245–46, 248. In addition, it is worth noting 
that the highest courts of Canada and Australia have held that Aboriginal or Native title is 
proprietary in nature. See Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, (1997) 3 S.C.R. 1010 (Can.); 
Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, (2014) 2 S.C.R. 257 (Can.); Mabo v. Queensland 
[No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1 (Austl.). Given that title in these jurisdictions is based on British 
law that existed prior to the independence of these countries and that Chief Justice Marshall 
in Johnson also relied on that law, one would expect similar results. See BRIAN SLATTERY, 
ANCESTRAL LANDS, ALIEN LAWS: JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVES ON ABORIGINAL TITLE (1983); 
SIMON YOUNG, THE TROUBLE WITH TRADITION: NATIVE TITLE AND CULTURAL CHANGE 
(2008). Note, too, that in Canada, Aboriginal title is protected not only by the common law 
but also by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, 
(U.K.) 1982, ch. 11. Indeed, Aboriginal land rights are the only property rights that enjoy 
this protection, as there is no equivalent in the Canadian Constitution to the Fifth 
Amendment safeguarding property rights generally. 
 23. For confirmation of the plenary power doctrine in the twenty-first century, see Lara, 
541 U.S. 193. For criticism of the doctrine, see Frickey, supra note 8; Robert N. Clinton, 
There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113 (2002); 
ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, 
AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 71–83 (2005). 
 24. 187 U.S. 553 (1903). 
 25. Id. at 565. 
 26. Id. at 568. 
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reservation lands as “tribal property,” and Congress is subject to the Fifth 
Amendment.27  
Similarly, in the more recent case of United States v. Sioux Nation,28 the 
United States was required to pay just compensation to the Sioux Nation for 
the congressional taking of the Black Hills that had been part of the Great 
Sioux Reservation established by the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868. The 
Supreme Court distinguished Lone Wolf from this case on the basis that 
Congress had purported to pay just compensation in Lone Wolf, whereas it 
had not to the Sioux Nation. Moreover, the Court rejected its suggestion in 
Lone Wolf that “relations between this Nation and the Indian tribes are a 
political matter, not amenable to judicial review.”29 The Court cited several 
cases, some of which pre-dated Tee-Hit-Ton, to affirm Congress’s power 
over tribal affairs is subject to “pertinent constitutional restrictions,” 
including the Fifth Amendment.30  
Significantly, Justice Reed did not rely on or even cite Lone Wolf in Tee-
Hit-Ton. He was obviously aware that in order to avoid the application of 
the Fifth Amendment, he had to decide that original Indian title is not 
proprietary and Lone Wolf would have been of no assistance to him in that 
regard. So, Justice Reed relied principally on Chief Justice Marshall’s 
decision in Johnson instead. However, he must have been aware that he was 
manipulating judicial precedent by, in Professor Joseph Singer’s words, 
“making the most of its dicta about conquest and discovery, ignoring the 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Id. Even according to the law as formulated by Justice Reed in Tee-Hit-Ton, 
compensation would have been payable under the Fifth Amendment because the Comanche 
and Kiousa’s title to the reservation had been recognized by a treaty. 
 28. 448 U.S. 371 (1980). 
 29. Id. at 413. 
 30. Id. at 415 (citing United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 109–10 (1935); 
Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 497–98 (1936); United States v. Klamath 
Indians, 304 U.S. 119, 123 (1938); United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 115–16 
(1938); Federal Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 122 (1960); 
Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968)). The Court nonetheless 
acknowledged in Sioux Nation that, given the Tee-Hit-Ton decision, 
the taking by the United States of “unrecognized” or “aboriginal” Indian title is 
not compensable under the Fifth Amendment. . . . The principles we set forth 
today are applicable only to instances in which “Congress, by treaty or other 
agreement, has declared that, thereafter, Indians were to hold the lands 
permanently.” In such instances, “compensation must be paid for subsequent 
taking.” 
Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 415 n.29 (citations omitted) (citing Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United 
States, 348 U.S. 272, 277–78 (1955)). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol44/iss1/2
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actual holding of the case.”31 Moreover, Reed deliberately disregarded 
authority that did not support his view that Indian title is merely non-
proprietary, permissive occupation of government-owned land,32 citing 
Worcester only in an unrelated footnote and not referring to Fletcher, 
Cherokee Nation, or Mitchel at all.33 As both Professor Singer and 
Professor Newton have described in much greater detail, Reed’s opinion on 
the nature of Indian title simply cannot be reconciled with previous 
Supreme Court decisions.34 The question remains: what caused Reed to 
consciously disregard precedent? 
In her article, Professor Newton suggested three possible motivations for 
Justice Reed’s departure from precedent.35 The first she termed “realism,” 
noting that he may have believed that his view that Indian lands had 
generally been taken by conquest was more consistent with historical reality 
than the notion that they had been purchased. But, as Newton pointed out, 
                                                                                                                 
 31. Singer, supra note 1, at 246; cf. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 89–95. 
 32. This view was strengthened in Reed’s January 24, 1955 draft, where he replaced 
“the policy of Indian gratuities for taking Indian title” with “the policy of Indian gratuities 
for the termination of Indian occupancy of Government-owned land” in the last paragraph of 
his judgment. Reed Collection: Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, supra note 9, at Box 159. See supra 
text accompanying note 9. 
 33. In Lone Wolf, Justice White acknowledged that 
in decisions of this Court, the Indian right of occupancy of tribal lands, whether 
declared in a treaty or otherwise created, has been stated to be sacred, or, as 
sometimes expressed, as sacred as the fee of the United States in the same 
lands. But in none of these cases was there involved a controversy between 
Indians and the government respecting the power of Congress to administer the 
property of the Indians. The questions considered in the cases referred to, 
which either directly or indirectly had relation to the nature of the property 
rights of the Indians, concerned the character and extent of such rights as 
respected states or individuals. 
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564–65 (1903) (citations omitted) (citing Johnson v. 
M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543, 574 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 
1, 48 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 581 (1832); United States v. 
Cook, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591, 592 (1873); Leavenworth, L. & G.R. Co. v. United States, 92 
U.S. 733, 755 (1875); Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877)). But, as pointed out 
above, although Congress has power that states and individuals do not have to take tribal 
lands, this does not mean it can do so without paying compensation. As held by Chief Justice 
Vinson in United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks (Tillamooks I), “Admitting the 
undoubted power of Congress to extinguish original Indian title compels no conclusion that 
compensation need not be paid.” 329 U.S. 40, 47 (1946); see discussion infra text 
accompanying notes 50–94. 
 34. Singer, supra note 1, at 243–47; Newton, supra note 11, at 1220–28. 
 35. Newton, supra note 11, at 1246–53. 
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even if the United States had often failed to respect the rights of the Indian 
tribes as articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in the 1820s and 1830s, that 
failure was not a reason to reject the principles on which those rights were 
based. Moreover, the Indians of Alaska have never been conquered, neither 
by the Russians nor by the United States after it purchased the territory 
from them in 1867. As Newton succinctly put it, “The only sovereign act 
that can be said to have conquered the Alaska native was the Tee-Hit-Ton 
opinion itself.”36 I am therefore skeptical of the realism explanation. In my 
opinion, Reed simply rewrote history in order to rationalize his opinion 
that, whatever land rights the Indian nations had before colonization, those 
rights were extinguished, making the Indians permissive occupants of 
government-owned land.37 Conquest provided a facile explanation for 
extinguishment. 
Another explanation Newton gave is that the Tee-Hit-Ton case came to 
court at the height of the termination period of American Indian policy,38 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Id. at 1244. 
 37. See supra text accompanying notes 7, 9. In Worcester, Marshall described the 
British policy for acquiring Indian lands: “The king purchased their lands when they were 
willing to sell, at a price they were willing to take; but never coerced a surrender of them.” 
31 U.S. at 547; see also Tillamooks I, 329 U.S. at 47–48 (Vinson, C.J.) (“The early 
acquisition of Indian lands in the main progressed by a process of negotiation and treaty. The 
first treaties reveal the striking deference paid to Indian claims, as the analysis in Worcester, 
clearly details. It was usual policy not to coerce the surrender of lands without consent and 
without compensation. The great drive to open Western lands in the 19th Century, however 
productive of sharp dealing, did not wholly subvert the settled practice of negotiated 
extinguishment of original Indian title. In 1896, this Court noted that . . . ‘nearly every tribe 
and band of Indians within the territorial limits of the United States was under some treaty 
relations with the government.’ Something more than sovereign grace prompted the obvious 
regard given to original Indian title.” (citation omitted) (citing Marks v. United States, 161 
U.S. 297 (1896)). 
 38. Newton, supra note 11, at 1249–50; see also WILKINS, supra note 2, at 166–67. The 
termination period was initiated less than two years prior to the Tee-Hit-Ton decision by 
House Concurrent Resolution 108, which declared it to be 
the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible, to make the Indians within the 
territorial limits of the United States subject to the same laws and entitled to the 
same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of the 
United States, to end their status as wards of the United States, and to grant 
them all of the rights and prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship. 
H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953), 67 Stat. B132. Though framed in the 
language of equality, this policy was designed to do away with tribal sovereignty and 
territories and assimilate Indians into American society as individual citizens. See DONALD 
L. FIXICO, TERMINATION AND RELOCATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY, 1945–1960, at 91–110 
(1986); INDIAN SELF-RULE: FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS OF INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS FROM 
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which was based on the ethnocentric view that Indian societies and cultures 
are inferior to the dominant American culture. Assimilation was therefore 
thought to be in the best interests of the Indians. There is certainly evidence 
in Justice Reed’s decision that he regarded Indian societies as inferior. For 
example, he referred to them as “savage tribes” who were forced by the 
“drive of civilization” to give up their “ancestral ranges.”39 I have no doubt 
that this ethnocentricity was a factor, albeit a misinformed and improper 
one, that influenced his decision.40 Linked to this mindset was the notion 
that Indian tribes living predominantly by means of hunting and fishing 
should not be accorded property rights to the vast territories over which 
they “roamed.”41 
In my opinion, it was Newton’s third explanation—namely, that 
compensating Indians for the taking of their lands would cost the 
government too much money—that was foremost in Justice Reed’s mind. 
As already mentioned, his decision in Tee-Hit-Ton was based explicitly on 
policy. He thought it was up to Congress to determine what compensation, 
if any, should be paid to the Indian nations for the taking of their lands, and 
courts should not impede this discretionary power by according Fifth 
Amendment protection to Indian title. An evident reason for this position 
was his opinion that the financial weight of constitutional protection would 
impose an onerous burden on the United States government. In a footnote 
in the Tee-Hit-Ton decision, he noted that government lawyers had “pointed 
out that if aboriginal Indian title was compensable without specific 
legislation to that effect, there were claims with estimated interest already 
pending under the Indian jurisdictional act aggregating $9,000,000,000.”42 
                                                                                                                 
ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 111–85 (Kenneth R. Philp ed., 1986) [hereinafter INDIAN SELF-
RULE]; ROBERTA ULRICH, AMERICAN INDIAN NATIONS FROM TERMINATION TO RESTORATION, 
1953–2006 (2010). 
 39. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 281, 289–90 (1955). 
 40. See WILLIAMS, supra note 23. On how attitudes of racial and cultural superiority 
have influenced government policy and judicial decisions on Indian rights in the United 
States and Canada, see Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The 
Hard Trial of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 
WIS. L. REV. 219; Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary 
Legacy of European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian 
Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 237 (1989); KENT MCNEIL, FLAWED PRECEDENT: THE ST. 
CATHERINE’S CASE AND ABORIGINAL TITLE 8–18 (2019). 
 41. See infra note 64; see infra notes 135–39 and accompanying text. 
 42. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 283 n.17. The Act referred to was the Indian Claims 
Commission Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-726, 60 Stat. 1049. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF 
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.06[3], at 438–40 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2012) 
[hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK]. 
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This figure was likely inflated,43 but even if accurate, it seems unreasonable 
that the sheer cost of honoring constitutional property rights should serve as 
a basis for denying them.44 This idea poses another question to consider. 
Would the potential amount have been a factor if compensation for 
government taking was owed to non-Indigenous ranchers or wealthy 
corporations instead of Indian nations?45 Nonetheless, this estimate clearly 
influenced Reed—and probably other members of the Court—in 
concluding that the taking of Indian title land is not compensable under the 
Fifth Amendment. Although Reed did not explicitly state that he relied on 
this number to reach the conclusion in Tee-Hit-Ton,46 a memorandum 
between justices is telling. Dated January 21, 1955, in a memorandum from 
Justice Reed to Justice Hugo Black that apparently accompanied the draft 
                                                                                                                 
 43. See Newton, supra note 11, at 1248–49 (pointing out that the actual total of Indian 
Claims Commission awards for all the claims the government had listed amounted to 
slightly less than $150 million, bringing the aggregate figure to just over one billion if 
interest were added); see also MICHAEL LIEDER & JAKE PAGE, WILD JUSTICE: THE PEOPLE OF 
GERONIMO VS. THE UNITED STATES 136 (1997). The final figure those authors gave for 
Indian Claims Commission Act cases was about $1.3 billion. Putting this figure into 
perspective, they noted that, based on the Native American population of about 1.5 million 
in 1980, this would have amounted to less than $1000 per person. By way of comparison, 
they observed that, “Under an act passed in 1988, citizens of Japanese ancestry who were 
interned during World War II became eligible to receive $20,000 apiece, as well as a formal 
apology from Congress.” Id. at 257. Roger Buffalohead pointed out in regard to the claims 
settled through the Commission that “the United States government ended up paying Indian 
people fifty cents an acre for the United States of America. The title was quieted, but in 
many cases it is still unsettled.” Quoted in INDIAN SELF-RULE, supra note 38, at 150. 
 44. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Band v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 602 (1935) (“[T]he 
Fifth Amendment commands that, however great the nation’s need, private property shall 
not be thus taken even for a wholly public use without just compensation.”). Compare this 
with Justice Reed’s statement in Tee-Hit-Ton in the quotation at text accompanying supra 
note 9, to the effect that the expansion of the United States required Indian lands to be taken 
without any legal obligation to pay compensation. 
 45. See WILLIAMS, supra note 23, on the racial discrimination inherent in the decision. 
 46. Significantly, however, in an earlier undated draft of his Tee-Hit-Ton judgment 
Reed had written in the last paragraph: 
What in this case would be that value [of the obligations owed to the Tee-Hit-
Tons if original Indian title is a compensable legal right]? The worth of the land 
and timber when taken as alleged under this Resolution of 1947 and the Fifth 
Amendment? There was no taking of Indian occupancy before that time. Would 
mineral rights be compensable? Indians with recognized titles have profited 
from oil. 
Reed Collection: Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, supra note 9, at Box 159. In the judgment he 
delivered, these sentences were replaced with the first sentence in the quotation at text 
accompanying supra note 9. 
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judgment he circulated to Black and other members of the Court, Reed 
wrote: 
It is important, however, to get your adherence to this opinion. 
Otherwise, it may well be that interest will be earned by claims 
for old takings under the I.C.A. [Indian Claims Commission 
Act47]. We did not bar this in Tillamooks.[48] That was not I.C.A. 
The U.S. says that 1¾ billions in claims are before the I.C.A. and 
7 ¼ billions in interest. Furthermore what is the value-test in the 
I.C.A. – value at taking or what seems fair to the I.C.A. . . . Let’s 
get it decided now that Fifth Amendment taking of Indian title is 
not compensable without congressional action as I think you said 
in first Tillamooks, 329 U.S., and Shoshone, 324 U.S.49 
To understand the significance of this memorandum, we must examine the 
Tillamooks case, as it reveals how the debate over recognized and 
unrecognized Indian lands rights originated in the mid-1940s, only to be 
resolved a decade later in Tee-Hit-Ton when Justice Reed was able to swing 
a divided Court to his view that only recognized rights enjoy constitutional 
protection. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 47. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. See also Singer, supra note 1, at 247 
(observing that, before the Tee-Hit-Ton decision, pre-judgment interest might have been 
payable on Indian Claims Commission judgments if the Fifth Amendment applied to original 
Indian title). But as Singer pointed out, “The act was intended to put to rest Indian claims for 
unjust takings of property once and for all. For that reason, the idea that the United States 
could not afford to pay for the land flew in the face of then-existing congressional policy.” 
Id. 
 48. United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks (Tillamooks II), 341 U.S. 48 (1951). 
 49. Reed to Black (Jan. 21, 1955), in Reed Collection: Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, supra note 
9, at Box 159. This memo does not bear Reed’s name or signature, but the file contains a 
version of it in his handwriting and the content shows it is from him. The two cases referred 
to at the end of the memo are Tillamooks I, in which Justice Black wrote a short concurring 
judgment expressing the view that the Tillamooks and other Indian nations had no legal or 
equitable claim against the government for the taking of their lands by the United States 
except as provided by statute, and Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 
324 U.S. 335, 354–58 (1945), in which Justice Black joined in a concurring judgment with 
Justice Jackson expressing their view that the obligations of the United States to the 
Shoshone were merely moral, as an 1863 treaty with them did not give rise to legal rights. 
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II. The Tillamooks Case 
In United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks (Tillamooks I),50 decided in 
1946, four Indian tribes brought an action in the Court of Claims under a 
1935 jurisdictional Act of Congress that gave these tribes access to the 
courts to sue the United States on the basis of “any and all legal and 
equitable claims arising under or growing out of the original Indian title” to 
certain lands.51 The Supreme Court decided that the plaintiffs had proven 
their original Indian title and were entitled to compensation for the taking of 
those lands by the government. According to the Court, in a judgment 
delivered by Chief Justice Vinson52 and joined by Justices Frankfurter, 
Douglas, and Murphy, this was the first time it had to decide “whether the 
Indians ha[d] a cause of action for compensation arising out of an 
involuntary taking of lands held by original Indian title.”53 Prior to this, 
“[a]s against any but the sovereign, original Indian title was accorded the 
protection of complete ownership; but it was vulnerable to affirmative 
action by the sovereign, which possessed exclusive power to extinguish the 
right of occupancy at will.”54 However, “[a]dmitting the undoubted power 
of Congress to extinguish original Indian title compels no conclusion that 
compensation need not be paid.”55  
What barred Indian nations in the past from suing the federal government 
for a unilateral taking of their lands was the procedural barrier of sovereign 
immunity.56 Once that barrier had been removed by the 1935 jurisdictional 
Act, they were able to sue and were entitled to recover on the basis of their 
                                                                                                                 
 50. 329 U.S. 40 (1946). 
 51. Id. at 41 (quoting Act of Aug. 26, 1935, ch. 686, § 1, 49 Stat. 801, 801). 
 52. Tillamooks I was the first Court opinion written by Vinson after he took the oaths of 
office as Chief Justice on June 24, 1946. See JOHN D. FASSETT, NEW DEAL JUSTICE: THE LIFE 
OF STANLEY REED OF KENTUCKY 416 (1994). Remarkably, in this 755-page biography of 
Reed, Fassett devotes less than a paragraph to the Tee-Hit-Ton case. See id. at 585–86. 
 53. Tillamooks I, 329 U.S. at 47. 
 54. Id. at 46. The authority the Court cited for Indian title amounting to complete 
ownership against anyone except the sovereign was United States v. Santa Fe Pacific 
Railroad Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941). 
 55. Tillamooks I, 329 U.S. at 47. 
 56. Id. at 45. 
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original Indian title.57 As Chief Justice Vinson pointed out, the 1935 Act 
would be of no benefit to tribes without an entitlement to compensation.58  
In Tillamooks I, the government argued that compensation would be 
payable only if the tribes, in addition to proving their original Indian title, 
could point to some official act of title recognition by the government. This 
notion raised the distinction between recognized and unrecognized Indian 
title that prominently came to fruition in Justice Reed’s opinion in Tee-Hit-
Ton. Chief Justice Vinson examined the government’s cited case law and 
found it did not support the contention that only recognized title is 
compensable.  
In particular, Chief Justice Vinson commented on Northwestern Bands of 
Shoshone Indians v. United States,59 a judgment delivered by Justice Reed 
the previous year. The issue in that case was whether the 1863 Box Elder 
Treaty with the Shoshone had given rise to a claim against the United States 
for compensation for the taking of lands within the meaning of a 
jurisdictional Act of 1929,60 which authorized the Court of Claims to 
adjudicate such claims. Justice Reed decided that a compensation claim did 
not arise from the treaty, as required by the 1929 Act, because the treaty did 
not acknowledge that the Shoshone had Indian title to the lands in question. 
As pointed out by Chief Justice Vinson in Tillamooks I, the Northwestern 
Bands of Shoshone decision did not involve original Indian title; instead, it 
relied on a statute requiring that a claim, in order to be adjudicated under 
the Act, had to arise out of the treaty. Regarding the interpretation of the 
treaty, Justice Reed concluded in Northwestern Bands of Shoshone that no 
claim arose out of it because  
the parties did not intend to recognize or acknowledge by that 
treaty the Indian title to the lands in question. Whether the lands 
were in fact held by the Shoshones by Indian title from 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Original Indian title had to be a pre-existing legal right because the 1935 Act did not 
create any “new right or cause of action . . . . A merely moral claim is not made a legal one.” 
Id. 
 58. Id. at 51–54. The Court relied on the following quotation from Minnesota v. 
Hitchcock: “[T]he Indians’ right of occupancy has always been held to be sacred; something 
not to be taken from him except by his consent, and then upon such consideration as should 
be agreed upon.” 185 U.S. 373, 389 (1902). 
 59. 324 U.S. 335 (1945); see supra note 49. 
 60. Act of Feb. 28, 1929, ch. 377, 45 Stat. 1407. 
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occupancy or otherwise or what rights flow to the Indians from 
such title is not involved.61 
Chief Justice Vinson therefore observed in Tillamooks I that the 
Northwestern Bands of Shoshone decision was not authority for the 
government’s alleged distinction between recognized and unrecognized 
Indian title, noting that the Court in that case had “made no attempt to settle 
controversies brought under other jurisdictional acts authorizing the 
litigation of claims arising from the taking of original Indian title.”62 
Summing up, he stated: 
Requiring formal acknowledgment of original Indian title as well 
as proof of that title would nullify the intended consequences of 
the 1935 Act. The rigors of “recognition,” according to 
petitioner’s [U.S. government’s] view, would appear to require 
in every case some definite act of the United States guaranteeing 
undisturbed, exclusive and perpetual occupancy, which, for 
example, a treaty or statute could provide. Yet it was the very 
absence of such acknowledgment which gave rise to the present 
statute.63 
Significantly, Justice Reed wrote a dissenting opinion in Tillamooks I 
that was joined by Justices Rutledge and Burton.64 He started off by 
                                                                                                                 
 61. 324 U.S. at 354. Justice Douglas dissented in this case, as he thought the claims 
asserted did arise or grow out of the 1863 treaty. Justices Murphy and Frankfurter agreed 
and applied the “well-settled rule that in the interpretation of Indian treaties all ambiguities 
are to be resolved in favor of the Indians.” Id. at 362. 
 62. Tillamooks I, 329 U.S. at 51. 
 63. Id. at 53. 
 64. In his diary, Justice Frankfurter observed that conference discussion of the case had 
generated considerable friction among members of the Court. He remarked that “Stanley 
Reed has written a rather stiff dissent and the Chief [Justice Vinson] showed extreme 
sensitiveness about it, as indeed he did to me yesterday when he said he did not quite 
understand ‘why Stanley should write a dissent in such strong terms.’” FELIX FRANKFURTER, 
FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 304 (Joseph P. Lash ed., 1975) (entry for 
Saturday, November 23, 1946). Reed’s disagreement with the Chief Justice, as well as his 
attitude towards compensating Indians for the taking of their lands, is revealed as well in his 
handwritten comments on the back of the last page of a draft judgment that Vinson had 
circulated. Reed wrote: 
Congress carefully and in accordance with well recognized principles of fair 
dealing with the Indians offered them compensation for legal and equitable 
claims which this Court now interprets with extravagant generosity with public 
money into a requirement to pay for lands over which the ancestors of these 
tribes hunted with the freedom of birds of prey. 
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discussing the policy consideration of the potential cost if compensation 
were payable for unrecognized original Indian title:  
It is difficult to foresee the result of this ruling in the 
consideration of claims by Indian tribes against the United 
States. We do not know the amount of land so taken. West of the 
Mississippi it must be large. Even where releases of Indian title 
have been obtained in return for recognition of Indian rights to 
smaller areas, charges of unfair dealings may open up to 
consideration again legal or equitable claims for taking 
aboriginal lands.65 
In a footnote at the end of this passage, he quoted at length from the Indian 
Claims Commission Act, enacted just three months earlier, which 
authorized the Commission to hear Indian claims based on law or equity as 
well as on “fair and honorable dealings.”66 
Justice Reed was obviously concerned about the potential reach of the 
removal of the sovereign immunity barrier. His solution to this perceived 
threat to the federal treasury was to deny legal status to unrecognized 
original Indian title: 
The character of Indian occupancy of tribal lands is at least of 
two kinds: first, occupancy as aborigines until that occupancy is 
interrupted by governmental order; and, second, occupancy 
when by an act of Congress they are given a definite area as a 
place upon which to live. When Indians receive recognition of 
their right to occupy lands by an act of Congress, they have a 
right of occupancy which cannot be taken from them without 
compensation. But by the other type of occupancy, it may be 
called Indian title, the Indians get no right to continue to occupy 
the lands; and any interference with their occupancy by the 
United States has not heretofore given rise to any right of 
compensation, legal or equitable.67 
                                                                                                                 
University of Kentucky, Margaret I. King Library, Special Collections, Stanley Forman 
Reed Collection, 81M3, at Box 99, Supreme Court Series, Opinions File, October Term 
1946, Case No. 26, United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks. 
 65. Tillamooks I, 329 U.S. at 55–56. 
 66. Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-726, § 2, 60 Stat. 1049, 
1050. 
 67. Tillamooks I, 329 U.S. at 57–58 (footnotes omitted). 
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Reed found support for this distinction between recognized occupancy and 
unrecognized Indian title in the heavily criticized doctrine of discovery,68 
which he said gave the “conquering” European nations “the right to 
extinguish that Indian title without legal responsibility to compensate the 
Indian for his loss.”69 However, that is not how Chief Justice Marshall 
described the discovery doctrine in Worcester v. Georgia.70 For him, the 
doctrine only applied among the European powers—it did not diminish the 
pre-existing rights of the Indian nations because they had not agreed to it.71 
Johnson v. M’Intosh72 prevented Indian nations from selling their lands to 
Europeans other than the sovereign of the discovering nation, but it did not 
follow from this that the sovereign could simply take Indian lands without 
paying compensation. As held by Chief Justice Vinson and Justices 
Frankfurter, Douglas, and Murphy in Tillamooks I, what had previously 
prevented compensation was the procedural bar of sovereign immunity, not 
original Indian title’s lack of legal character and government recognition. 
Nonetheless, Justice Reed thought that the conclusion of the majority in 
Tillamooks I that compensation was payable once that bar was removed 
“conflict[ed] with our understanding of this Government’s right in the 
public lands of the nation.”73 The assumption Reed made in this quotation 
from his dissent, which is not consistent with earlier Supreme Court 
decisions referred to above,74 is that Indian title lands are “public lands.” 
                                                                                                                 
 68. See, e.g., VINE DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES: AN INDIAN 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 85–111 (1985); DAVID E. WILKINS & K. TSIANINA 
LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN GROUND: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW 19–63 
(2001); FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN LANDSCAPE: INDIANS, INDIAN TRIBES, AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 88–115 (2009); ROBERT J. MILLER ET AL., DISCOVERING INDIGENOUS LANDS: 
THE DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY IN THE ENGLISH COLONIES (2010); Blake A. Watson, The 
Impact of the American Doctrine of Discovery on Native Land Rights in Australia, Canada, 
and New Zealand, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 507 (2011); McNeil, supra note 19. 
 69. Tillamooks I, 329 U.S. at 58. In a footnote, Reed stated that the “Treaty of Paris, 
1783, confirmed the sovereignty of the United States without reservation of Indian rights.” 
Id. at 58 n.6. But in the international law governing treaties and in American law, property 
rights are presumed to continue after a change in sovereignty. See D.P. O’CONNELL, STATE 
SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1967) (two volumes); see, e.g., 1 
id. at 240 nn.3–4; United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 86–87 (1833). 
 70. Justice Reed summarily dismissed the relevance of Worcester on the basis that 
“lands had been specifically set apart for the Cherokees.” Tillamooks I, 329 U.S. at 63. 
 71. See text accompanying supra note 18. 
 72. See 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
 73. Tillamooks I, 329 U.S. at 57. 
 74. See the numerous cases, starting with Fletcher, where the Supreme Court has held 
that government grants of land subject to Indian title do not give the grantee a right to 
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The extent to which he was willing to push this assumption is revealed in 
his shocking conclusion that “Indians who continued to occupy their 
aboriginal homes, without definite recognition of their right to do so are 
like paleface squatters on public lands without compensable rights if they 
are evicted.”75 In other words, without express government permission, 
Indians would be trespassers on government land. In reaching this 
conclusion, Reed was selective, as he would be in Tee-Hit-Ton, in citing 
passages from Chief Justice Marshall’s judgment in Johnson v. M’Intosh 
that emphasized government power to extinguish Indian title while ignoring 
other passages that acknowledged Indian title’s legal character.76 Reed 
concluded in his dissent that no compensation was payable because the 
jurisdictional Act of 1935 did not “create a new liability because Indian title 
had been taken.”77 
Justice Black wrote a judgment concurring with the opinion of the Court 
given by Chief Justice Vinson. He stated: 
Before Congress passed the special Act under which this suit 
was brought, I think that the Government was under no more 
legal or equitable obligation to pay these respondents than it was 
under obligation to pay whatever descendants are left of the 
numerous other tribes whose lands and homes have been taken 
from them since the Nation was founded.78 
He thus appears to have agreed with Justice Reed that original Indian title 
does not give rise to legal rights. The only authority he gave was the 1945 
Northwestern Bands of Shoshone decision, citing the concurring opinion of 
Justice Jackson in which he had joined.79 Given that the decision in that 
case dealt with treaty interpretation and did not involve original Indian title, 
and that Justice Jackson’s opinion was a concurring minority judgment, that 
opinion is hardly persuasive that original Indian title is not legal in nature. 
Justice Black nonetheless concurred with the result in Tillamooks I because 
he thought the 1935 jurisdictional Act “created an obligation on the part of 
                                                                                                                 
possession until the Indian title has been legitimately extinguished, discussed in Kent 
McNeil, Extinguishment of Native Title: The High Court and American Law, 2 AUSTL. 
INDIGENOUS L. REP. 365 (1997). If the Indian titleholders had no legal land rights, their 
occupation would be no impediment to the grantees taking possession. 
 75. Tillamooks I, 329 U.S. at 58. 
 76. Id. at 60–62. 
 77. Id. at 63. 
 78. Id. at 54. 
 79. See supra note 49. 
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the Government to pay these Indians for all lands to which their ancestors 
held an ‘original Indian title’.”80  
Interestingly, in his dissenting judgment in Tillamooks I, Justice Reed 
commented directly on Justice Black’s concurring judgment. He disagreed 
with Black’s interpretation of the 1935 Act, as he did not think it created a 
government obligation arising out of original Indian title if that title did not 
give rise to rights in the first place.81 Reed, however, still regarded Justice 
Black’s concurring judgment in Tillamooks I, along with Black’s joinder 
with Justice Jackson’s concurring judgment in Northwestern Bands of 
Shoshone, as significant because he mentioned these instances in his 
January 21, 1955 memorandum to Black to try to persuade him to deny 
Fifth Amendment protection to original Indian title.82  
In sum, Tillamooks I revealed how deeply divided the Court was on the 
issue of original Indian title: four judges—Chief Justice Vinson and Justices 
Frankfurter, Douglas, and Murphy—were of the opinion that, as long as 
Congress had waived sovereign immunity, original Indian title was a 
judicially enforceable legal right without any need for government 
recognition; whereas, Justices Reed, Rutledge, and Burton opined that 
original Indian title had to be recognized in order to be enforceable. In his 
brief concurring judgment, Justice Black denied legal status to original 
Indian title, but he decided it had been made judicially enforceable by an 
Act of Congress in the circumstances of the Tillamooks I case. He did not 
use the word “recognized” in his judgment, stating instead that Congress 
“had created an obligation on the part of the Government.”83 However, one 
can understand how Reed might interpret this statement as support for the 
distinction between recognized and unrecognized Indian title. 
The Tillamooks II decision84 five years later involved the narrow issue of 
whether interest was payable on the compensation the government owed as 
a result of Tillamooks I. In a brief per curiam judgment, in which Justice 
Jackson took no part, the Court observed that the traditional rule is that 
interest is only payable on claims against the federal government if there is 
an express provision for interest in the statute or contract or the 
compensation is payable under the Fifth Amendment. Because the Court 
observed that the 1935 jurisdiction Act did not provide for an award of 
interest and opined that recovery in Tillamooks I was not based on the Fifth 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Tillamooks I, 329 U.S. at 54. 
 81. Id. at 64. 
 82. See supra text accompanying note 49. 
 83. Tillamooks I, 329 U.S. at 54. 
 84. Tillamooks II, 341 U.S. 48 (1951). 
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Amendment, it reversed the Court of Claims’ decision and held that interest 
was not payable. Remarkably, the Supreme Court did not give a specific 
reason why this was not a Fifth Amendment taking, other than stating: 
“Looking to the former opinions in this case, we [found] that none of them 
expressed the view that recovery was grounded on a taking under the Fifth 
Amendment.”85 It is true that, in its lower court decision in Tillamooks I,86 
the Court of Claims did not mention the Fifth Amendment, but in 
Tillamooks II that court stated that the issue for determination was “the 
amount of compensation to which the four plaintiff tribes are entitled under 
the Fifth Amendment, measured by the value of the lands taken on 
November 9, 1855, plus an additional amount measured by a reasonable 
rate of interest to make just compensation.”87  
But if compensation was not based on the Fifth Amendment, as the 
Supreme Court decided, what was it based on?88 According to Justice Black 
in his concurring judgment in Tillamooks I, government liability had been 
created by the 1935 jurisdiction Act. If this is correct, interest would not 
have been payable because the Act did not provide for interest. However, 
Black was only one member of an eight-member court, and no one 
concurred with him. Chief Justice Vinson and three other judges held that 
original Indian title gives rise to preexisting rights and the 1935 
jurisdictional Act simply removed sovereign immunity so that the Indian 
tribes could sue the United States on the basis of that title. Justices Reed, 
Rutledge, and Burton thought that original Indian title was not a source of 
legal rights and that the Act did not provide the tribes with any right to 
compensation from the government; yet, once a majority of the Court 
ordered the government to pay compensation in Tillamooks I, it would be 
understandable for these three dissenting judges to prefer Black’s 
explanation for liability to that of the Chief Justice because Black’s opinion 
was consistent with their view that original Indian title is not legally 
enforceable.89  
                                                                                                                 
 85. Id. at 49. 
 86. Alcea Band of Tillamooks v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 934 (Ct. Cl. 1945). 
 87. Alcea Band of Tillamooks v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 938, 940 (Ct. Cl. 1950). The 
Court of Claims awarded interest at five percent from 1855 to 1934 and four percent from 
1934 to 1950, only to be reversed by the Supreme Court. Id. at 954. 
 88. See Newton, supra note 11, at 1231–32. 
 89. Remarkably, in Tee-Hit-Ton, Justice Reed turned Justice Black’s concurring one-
justice judgment into the opinion of the Court. See the quotation at note 129, and the 
assessment of LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 43, at 135. 
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In 1949, Justices Murphy and Rutledge both died seven weeks apart 
while in office and were replaced by Justices Clark and Minton. The 
changes in justices presumably left the Court split three to three on the issue 
of whether to pay interest, with Clark’s and Minton’s opinions unknown.90 
And yet Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Frankfurter and Douglas went 
along with denial of Fifth Amendment protection and, therefore, the 
payment of interest, in Tillamooks II. Why? 
In Tillamooks II, the government lawyers included in their brief a list of 
all the claims pending before the Indian Claims Commission. They 
estimated the claims to total approximately nine billion dollars, of which 
over seven billion was interest.91 These were the figures that Justice Reed 
referred to in his January 21, 1955 memorandum to Justice Black, in which 
he urged his colleague to join him in deciding “that Fifth Amendment 
taking of Indian title is not compensable without congressional action.”92 In 
Reed’s opinion, Tillamooks II did not bar interest where claims were made 
under the Indian Claims Commission Act because Tillamooks was not a 
claim brought under the Act. It may have been that Chief Justice Vinson 
and Justices Frankfurter and Douglas were also impressed by these figures, 
albeit inflated,93 which might explain their apparent shift in position from 
Tillamooks I to Tillamooks II, as well as Douglas and Frankfurter’s reliance 
on recognition of Indian title instead of Fifth Amendment protection for 
original Indian title in their dissent (concurred in by Chief Justice Warren, 
who had replaced Vinson in 1953) in Tee-Hit-Ton.94 Two important cases 
from Alaska decided between Tillamooks I and Tillamooks II help to 
explain the evident positional shift of some members of the Supreme Court 
in relation to this matter. 
III. The Pre-Tee-Hit-Ton Alaska Cases 
The first of these cases, Miller v. United States,95 was decided by the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In 1942, the United States condemned 
                                                                                                                 
 90. Jackson took no part in either Tillamooks I or Tillamooks II. 
 91. Newton, supra note 11, at 1248 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 55–56). 
 92. See supra text accompanying note 49. 
 93. See supra note 43. 
 94. Given that the Acts they relied upon as recognizing Indian land rights in Alaska did 
not provide for interest for taking, their dissenting judgment would not have resulted in an 
award of interest, unlike a decision based on the Fifth Amendment. 
 95. 159 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1947). For background and commentary on the case, see 
Haycox, supra note 1, at 132–35; MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 322–23; Singer, supra note 1, 
at 233–34. 
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10.95 acres of tidelands in Juneau, Alaska, for the establishment of 
wharfage facilities pursuant to the Second War Powers Act of 1942.96 In 
response, the appellants filed a compensation claim, alleging that from time 
immemorial, they and their predecessors, being Tlingit Indians, had been 
and continued to be in exclusive possession of the condemned lands “under 
the laws, customs and usages of the Tlingit Indians of Alaska and in 
conformity with the laws of the United States.”97 The district court decision 
that “aboriginal title created no compensable interest against the United 
States”98 was overturned by a unanimous decision of the Ninth Circuit 
delivered by Justice Garrecht. While accepting that original Indian title is 
only a right of occupancy that cannot be alienated except to the United 
States, the Court pointed out that numerous Supreme Court decisions had 
also described this title as “sacred.” For example, in United States v. Cook, 
Chief Justice Waite “held that ‘the right of the Indians to their occupancy’ 
is not only as sacred as the right of private white landowners to their fee, 
but that it is ‘as sacred as that of the United States to the fee,’ i.e., as sacred 
as the fee title of the sovereign itself.”99 Garrecht noted as well that Chief 
Justice Marshall in Johnson v. M’Intosh stressed that the fee, whether held 
by the government or by its grantees, was “subject only to the Indian right 
of occupancy” a reoccurring phrase in Marshall’s judgment and subsequent 
Supreme Court decisions.100  
 Justice Garrecht then turned to the question of whether compensation 
should be paid when the government takes lands subject to the Indian right 
of occupancy, and he concluded that it should be: “It would be indulgence 
in pious and high-sounding but empty generalizations to say that the Indian 
right of occupancy is ‘sacred,’ and at the same time to refuse to grant 
compensation to Indian possessors when their land is taken away from them 
under condemnation proceedings.”101 Significantly, he relied heavily on 
Chief Justice Vinson’s decision in Tillamooks I in reaching this conclusion. 
On the issue of whether compensation should be paid for the taking of 
“unrecognized” Indian title, he quoted from that decision: 
Furthermore, some cases speak of the unlimited power of 
Congress to deal with those Indian lands which are held by what 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Pub. L. No. 77-507, 56 Stat. 177. 
 97. Miller, 159 F.2d at 999. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 1000 (quoting United States v. Cook, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591, 593 (1873)). 
 100. Id. (citing Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835)). 
 101. Id. at 1001. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
24 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
 
 
petitioner would call ‘recognized’ title; yet it cannot be doubted 
that, given the consent of the United States to be sued, recovery 
may be had for an involuntary, uncompensated taking of 
‘recognized’ title. We think the same rule applicable to a taking 
of original Indian title.102 
Justice Garrecht found support for this opinion in the following passage 
from United States v. Klamath Indians: 
The established rule is that the taking of property by the United 
States in the exertion of its power of eminent domain implies a 
promise to pay just compensation, i.e., value at the time of taking 
plus an amount sufficient to produce the full equivalent of that 
value paid contemporaneously with the taking.103 
He went on to hold that the Tlingit’s original Indian title had nonetheless 
been extinguished by the treaty of 1867—by which the United States had 
acquired Alaska from Russia—but that their possessory rights had been 
guaranteed by a series of congressional statutes, starting in 1884 with An 
Act Providing a Civil Government for Alaska.104 The Tlingits were 
therefore entitled to compensation for the government taking, not on the 
basis of their original Indian title, but because “[t]he true foundation of their 
right is the repeated Congressional recognition of the occupancy or 
possession of the land by the ‘Indians’ who were on the land at the time the 
act of 1884 was passed.”105 “Recognition” here referred to their possession 
in 1884, not of their original Indian title in the sense Justice Reed would 
require in Tee-Hit-Ton. 
The Klamath case that Justice Garrecht relied upon involved a claim by 
the Klamath and Moadoc Tribes and the Yahooskin Band of Snake Indians 
for compensation for a taking by the United States of lands from their 
                                                                                                                 
 102. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Tillamooks I, 329 U.S. 40, 51–52 (1946) (footnotes 
omitted)).  
 103. Id. (quoting United States v. Klamath & Moadoc Tribes, 304 U.S. 119, 123 (1938), 
which relied in turn on Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16–17 (1933), and cases cited 
therein). 
 104. Ch. 53, 23 Stat. 24 (1884). 
 105. Miller, 159 F.2d at 1005 (emphasis added). The issue of whether interest was 
payable was not considered, as the Court dealt only with the right to compensation, not the 
quantum. Id. at 1006. The case was remanded to the Alaska District Court, where the claim 
was dismissed, mainly because the Tlingit did not establish sufficient possession and 
continuity of usage after 1884. United States v. 10.95 Acres of Land in Juneau, 75 F. Supp. 
841 (1948). 
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reservation in Oregon. The tribes had ceded large swaths of land to the 
United States by treaty in 1864; the reservation consisted of the lands that 
remained with the tribes following the treaty. In other words, the lands in 
question were original Indian title lands that, by a provision in the treaty, 
were retained by the tribes “as a residence” and “regarded as an Indian 
reservation.”106 In 1906, the federal government conveyed 87,000 acres of 
the reservation to a private company, “without the knowledge or consent of 
the plaintiffs, and without giving them any compensation.”107 Later, the 
government paid the tribes an amount that, in light of the fact that there was 
valuable merchantable timber on the land, was a tiny fraction of the land’s 
worth. In 1936, Congress enacted a statute conferring jurisdiction on the 
Court of Claims to hear and enter judgment on their claim for 
compensation, irrespective of the fact that the tribes had signed a release 
when they received the unconscionably small payment. The Court of 
Claims found for the tribes and ordered the government to pay an amount 
equal to the full value of the land, including the value of the timber, plus 
five percent interest from the time of taking, minus the amount the 
government had previously paid. The United States appealed to the 
Supreme Court, arguing that the value of the timber should not have been 
included and that interest should not have been awarded because the taking 
did not involve exercise of the government’s power of eminent domain. 
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous judgment delivered by Justice 
Butler,108 rejected both of these contentions. The treaty, he said, “clearly did 
not detract from the tribes’ right of occupancy,” and “the timber was a part 
of the value of the land upon which it was standing.”109 Regarding interest, 
he stated, “It is appropriate first to observe that while the United States has 
power to control and manage the affairs of its Indian wards in good faith for 
their welfare, that power is subject to constitutional limitations, and does 
not enable the United States without paying just compensation therefor to 
appropriate lands of an Indian tribe to its own use or to hand them over to 
others.”110 Because the United States had the power to take the lands and 
the intent to do so, the lands were not taken by mistake or wrongfully 
appropriated; instead, the taking was authorized by law and was “a valid 
                                                                                                                 
 106. Klamath, 304 U.S. at 123. 
 107. Id. at 122. 
 108. He delivered the opinion of the Court, and Justice Black concurred in the result. Id. 
at 126  
 109. Id. at 123 (citing United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111 (1938), decided the 
same day). 
 110. Id. 
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exertion of the sovereign power of eminent domain. It therefore implied a 
promise on the part of the government to pay plaintiffs just 
compensation.”111 As authority, Justice Butler cited Jacobs v. United 
States,112 a Fifth Amendment taking case (not involving Indians) in which 
the Supreme Court held that just compensation includes interest from the 
time of taking. 
Justice Reed, who had been appointed to the Supreme Court by President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt just three months before Klamath was heard and 
decided, took no part in the case. In Tee-Hit-Ton, Justice Reed used 
Klamath as authority for the notion that “[w]here the Congress by treaty or 
other agreement has declared that thereafter Indians were to hold the lands 
permanently, compensation must be paid for subsequent taking.”113 After 
pointing out that Klamath had been relied upon by the Ninth Circuit in 
Miller v. United States114 and Minnesota v. Hitchcock,115 Justice Reed 
stated, “These cases, however, concern Government taking of lands held 
under Indian title recognized by the United States as an Indian 
reservation.”116 However, in Klamath, the Court did not use the term 
“recognized” in relation to original Indian title and did not imply that the 
tribes’ entitlement to compensation was based on Congressional 
acknowledgment of that title. On the contrary, compensation was payable, 
as reliance on Jacobs makes clear,117 under the Fifth Amendment because 
the reservation lands that were taken were original Indian title lands 
excluded from the lands surrendered by the 1864 treaty. Consequently, not 
only does the Klamath decision provide no support for Reed’s denial of 
Fifth Amendment protection to original Indian title—it is in direct 
contradiction to his position.118 
The other significant Alaska case leading up to Tillamooks II was Hynes 
v. Grimes Packing Co.,119 in which Justice Reed delivered the opinion of 
the Court and Justices Rutledge, Black, and Murphy (Justice Douglas 
                                                                                                                 
 111. Id. at 125. 
 112. 290 U.S. 13 (1933). 
 113. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 277–78 (1955). 
 114. 159 F.2d 997 (1947). 
 115. 185 U.S. 373 (1902). 
 116. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 282 n.15. 
 117. See also H.R. REP. NO. 74-2354 (1936), quoted in Klamath, 304 U.S. at 125 n.14 
(stating that the intention was to grant “the Klamath tribes the right to have their claim for 
just compensation under the Constitution for the taking of the 87,000 acres of their lands 
judicially determined on its merits”). 
 118. Accord Newton, supra note 11, at 1239–40. 
 119. 337 U.S. 86 (1949). 
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concurring in part) dissented in part. By a 1943 Order, the Secretary of the 
Interior designated a certain area, including tidelands and coastal waters, as 
an Indian reservation for the native inhabitants of Karluk. Then in 1946, the 
Secretary amended the Alaska Fisheries General Regulations to prohibit 
commercial fishing in the coastal waters included in the reservation, except 
“by natives in possession of the said reservation . . . [and] other persons 
under authority granted by said natives.”120 Canning companies that 
depended on fish from these waters claimed that this prohibition would 
substantially impact their businesses and asked the Alaska District Court to 
enjoin enforcement of the prohibition on the grounds that the order and 
amendment to the regulations were invalid. The district court granted the 
injunction, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, leading to a 
certiorari application to the Supreme Court. For reasons not relevant to our 
discussion, the Court held that the order including the coastal waters was 
valid, but found the amendment to the regulations limiting commercial 
fishing in those waters to the native inhabitants of the reservation and their 
licensees to be invalid (it was on the latter issue that four judges dissented, 
as they viewed the regulations as valid except to the extent that they 
permitted the Karluk Indians to grant authority to others to fish 
commercially in the reservation waters).121 However, instead of upholding 
the injunction, the Court remanded the case to the district court because an 
injunction is a purely equitable remedy, and public policy was at stake, as 
well as the interests of the Indians of the Karluk Reservation who were not 
parties.122 The Hynes case is nonetheless relevant to our discussion because 
of the following obiter comments that Justice Reed included in a footnote in 
relation to Tillamooks I and Miller: 
                                                                                                                 
 120. 50 C.F.R. § 208.23 (1946 Supp.). 
 121. Hynes, 337 U.S. 86. In a memorandum to Justice Reed dated February 1, 1949, 
Justice Douglas, one of the dissenters, had already expressed his disagreement with his 
colleague: 
The right to create Indian reservations should, I think, carry with it a right to 
grant to the Indians in question the exclusive right to fish therein. The problem 
in Alaska has been to protect the Indians and the public against the packing 
houses, not to protect the packing houses against the Indians. 
University of Kentucky, Margaret I. King Library, Special Collections, Stanley Forman 
Reed Collection, 81M3, Supreme Court Series, Opinions File, October Term 1948, Case No. 
24, Hynes v. Grimes Packing, Box 118 [hereinafter Reed Collection: Hynes], quoted in 
MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 279. 
 122. Hynes, 337 U.S. at 127. An amici curiae brief urging reversal had, however, been 
filed by Felix S. Cohen, James E. Curry, and Henry Cohen on behalf of the Native Village of 
Karluk.  
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We have carefully considered the opinion in Miller v. United 
States, where it is held . . . that the Indian right of occupancy of 
Alaska lands is compensable. With all respect to the learned 
judges, familiar with Alaska land laws, we cannot express 
agreement with that conclusion. The opinion upon which they 
chiefly rely, United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, is not an 
authority for this position. That opinion does not hold the Indian 
right of occupancy compensable without specific legislative 
direction to make payment. See also United States v. 10.95 Acres 
of Land in Juneau.123 
The problem here is that Reed was attempting (successfully, as it turned 
out in Tee-Hit-Ton) to impose his own view, as expressed in his dissent in 
Tillamooks I, that original Indian title is not compensable without 
congressional recognition. But that was not what Tillamooks I decided. On 
the contrary, four out of eight justices decided just the opposite, as 
expressed in the opinion of the Court delivered by Chief Justice Vinson. A 
fifth justice, Justice Black, decided there had been recognition, making it 
unnecessary for him to decide whether recognition was necessary.124 
Unfortunately, because Reed’s opinion in Hynes was the majority decision, 
with only four out of nine judges dissenting (including Justice Black), his 
erroneous interpretation of Tillamooks I thereby received a stamp of 
approval from the Supreme Court. Justice Frankfurter, who joined the 
majority in Hynes, later regretted this approval when Tee-Hit-Ton came 
before the Court. This is evidenced by his handwritten comments on Reed’s 
draft judgment in Tee-Hit-Ton. Here, Frankfurter penciled in the word 
“irrelevantly” before “commented” on page 10 (page 283 of the reported 
judgment) where Reed wrote in reference to footnote 28 in the Hynes case, 
“We there [irrelevantly] commented as to the first Tillamook case: ‘That 
opinion does not hold the Indian right of occupancy compensable without 
                                                                                                                 
 123. Id. at 106 n.28 (citations omitted) (citing Miller v. United States, 159 F. 2d 997, 
1001 (1947); United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40 (1946); United States 
v. 10.95 Acres of Land in Juneau, 75 F. Supp. 841 (1948)). On the 10.95 Acres case, see 
supra note 105. 
 124. Id. at 103. Black’s observation that, before Congress passed the 1935 jurisdictional 
Act allowing the tribes to sue in that case, the government had no legal or equitable 
obligation to pay them compensation for the taking of their lands, see supra text 
accompanying note 78, could be interpreted to mean that sovereign immunity prevented 
them from suing the United States, which would be consistent with the Chief Justice’s 
judgment. In any case, given Black’s conclusion that the 1835 Act imposed an obligation on 
the government to pay compensation, that observation was obiter. 
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specific legislative direction to make payment.’”125 Frankfurter also inserted 
a marginal, self-critical comment to Reed’s draft judgment: “and Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter must now be properly charged with negligence not to 
have scrutinized & asked to have deleted that unwarranted footnote.”126  
                                                                                                                 
 125. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 283 (1955). However, Reed 
attempted to make the footnote in Hynes necessary for the decision. In Tee-Hit-Ton, he noted 
that, in the Hynes’ footnote, “We further declared ‘we cannot express agreement with that 
(compensability of Indian title by the Miller case) conclusion.’” Id. In a footnote at the end 
of this sentence, he wrote: 
The statement concerning the Miller case was needed to meet the Grimes 
Packing Company argument that Congress could not have intended to authorize 
the Interior Department to include an important and valuable fishing area, in a 
permanent reservation for an Indian population of 57 eligible voters. Actual 
occupation of Alaskan lands by Indians authorized the creation of a reservation. 
One created by Congress through recognition of a permanent right in the 
Indians from aboriginal use would require compensation to them for re-opening 
to the public. It was therefore important to show that there was no right arising 
from aboriginal occupation. 
Id. at 283 n.16 (citations omitted) (citing Hynes, 337 U.S. at 86 n.10, 91, 103–06). See also 
Justice Reed, Memorandum to the Conference: Re No. 43, The Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. 
United States (n.d.) [hereinafter Memorandum to Conference], in Reed Collection: Tee-Hit-
Ton Indians, supra note 9, at Box 159, where he addressed the argument made in conference 
the previous Saturday that “the note was unnecessary to the decision in Hynes v. Grimes, 
337 U.S. 86” and argued in similar terms that the footnote was necessary to the decision. He 
went on to explain the connection between Tillamooks I, Hynes, and Tillamooks II. See infra 
note 129 and accompanying text. 
 126. Reed Collection: Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, supra note 9, at Box 159. On January 27, 
1949, in a memorandum to Reed in relation to his draft judgment in Hynes, Frankfurter 
expressed the view that the Court should not have granted certiorari and commented: 
When dealing with such specialized, pernickety matters as is the stuff of your 
opinion, inescapably one has to rely on the writer of the opinion and indulge in 
a game of follow-the-leader. Since Indians are not among those disadvantaged 
as to whom your “zeal for the underdog” weights your judicial judgment, I feel 
clear in my conscience to agree with you merely on the basis of a studious 
consideration of your opinion in light of my general feel in dealing with Indian 
legislation. 
Reed Collection: Hynes, supra note 121, at Box 118. From these remarks and Frankfurter’s 
comments on Reed’s draft opinion in Tee-Hit-Ton, one has to wonder whether he spent 
much time on Reed’s draft in Hynes or even read the offending footnote. However, in a 
subsequent hand-written note to Reed (April 14, 1949), Frankfurter queried why the Karluk 
Indians could not simply exclude the Grimes fishing boats from the reservation waters, and 
Reed in response (April 15, 1949) opined that they could “get an injunction against 
continued trespasses of commercial fishermen on the reservation.” Id. Frankfurter’s 
discontent with the way the argument went in Tee-Hit-Ton is also revealed in an interview 
Arthur Lazarus, who had replaced Felix Cohen as attorney for the Association on American 
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The damage had nonetheless been done. Justice Reed got his way in 
Tillamooks II and relied on that decision and his footnote in Hynes to carry 
the Court in Tee-Hit-Ton, stating that 
the Government used the Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co. note in 
the second Tillamook case, petition for certiorari, p. 10, to 
support its argument that the first Tillamook opinion did not 
decide that taking of original Indian title was compensable under 
the Fifth Amendment.[127] Thereupon this Court in the second 
Tillamook case, 341 U.S. 48, held that the first case was not 
“grounded on a taking under the Fifth Amendment.”[128] 
Therefore, no interest was due. . . . We think it must be 
concluded that the recovery in the Tillamook case was based 
upon statutory direction to pay for the aboriginal title in the 
special jurisdictional act to equalize the Tillamooks with the 
neighboring tribes, rather than upon a holding that there had 
been a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment.129 
                                                                                                                 
Indian Affairs when Cohen died in 1953 and who was in the audience when the case was 
argued, gave to Donald Mitchell: 
According to Lazarus, one of the justices asked Peocock [James Craig Peocock, 
lawyer for the Tee-Hit-Tons] whether he agreed that the Tee-Hit-Tons were not 
entitled to compensation if the Court disagreed that Tlingit aboriginal title was 
the Indian equivalent of fee simple ownership and Peacock answered yes. 
“[Justice] Felix Frankfurter slammed a book down and stormed off the bench.” 
“It was such a wrong answer,” Lazarus recalled. “I’m not saying that comment 
lost the case, but it damn sure didn’t help it.” 
Recounted in MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 357. 
 127. It was in a footnote at this point in his judgment that Justice Reed pointed to the 
potential cost of compensating the Indian nations for the taking of their lands, especially if 
interest was awarded: 
Three million dollars was involved in the Tillamook case as the value of the 
land, and the interest granted by the Court of Claims was $14,000,000. The 
Government pointed out that if aboriginal Indian title was compensable without 
specific legislation to that effect, there were claims with estimated interest 
already pending under the Indian jurisdictional act aggregating $9,000,000,000. 
Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 283 n.17. 
 128. Tillamook II, 341 U.S. 48, 49 (1951). 
 129. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 283–84. In his Memorandum to Conference, Reed had 
already laid out his position on the significance of Tillamooks II: 
At the time of the Miller decision and the lower court decisions in the Grimes 
case [Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co.], the first Alcea Band of Tillamooks had 
been decided in this Court. 329 U.S. 40. A plurality but less than a majority of 
this Court had apparently decided that original Indian title or rights were 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol44/iss1/2
No. 1]    JUSTICE REED AND THE TEE-HIT-TON DECISION 31 
 
 
Not even the dissenting judges in Tee-Hit-Ton—Justices Douglas and 
Frankfurter and Chief Justice Warren—disagreed with this conclusion, as 
they based their dissent instead on statutory recognition of pre-existing 
Indian rights by the Organic Act for Alaska of May 17, 1884.130 This Act 
provided that 
the Indians or other persons in the said district shall not be 
disturbed in the possession of any lands actually in their use or 
occupation or now claimed by them but the terms under which 
such persons may acquire title to such lands is reserved for 
future legislation by Congress.131  
Justice Reed for the majority reached the opposite conclusion, summarily 
dismissing the Tee-Hit-Ton’s argument that the Organic Act and a 1900 
statute132 providing for a civil government for Alaska had recognized their 
possessory rights. He stated: 
We have carefully examined these statutes and the pertinent 
legislative history and find nothing to indicate any intention by 
Congress to grant to the Indians any permanent rights in the 
lands of Alaska occupied by them by permission of Congress. 
                                                                                                                 
compensable. Later the Government used the Hynes v. Grimes note in the 
second Tillamook case, petn for cert. p. 10, to assist in escaping from the effect 
of the first Tillamook decision that the taking of original Indian title was 
compensable. Three million dollars was involved in the Tillamook case as the 
value of the land, and the interest granted by the Court of Claims was 
$14,000,000. The government there pointed out that if aboriginal Indian title 
was compensable without specific legislation to that effect, there were claims 
already pending under the Indian jurisdiction act aggregating $9,000,000,000. 
Thereupon this Court in the second Tillamooks case, 341 U.S. 48, held that the 
first case was not “grounded on a taking under the Fifth Amendment.” 
Therefore no interest was due. 
Memorandum to Conference, supra note 125. It may well have been this memorandum that 
persuaded the other members of the Court to accept Reed’s conclusion in Tee-Hit-Ton that 
no compensation is due for government taking of unrecognized Indian title. 
 130. Ch. 53, 23 Stat. 24 (1884). 
 131. Id. § 8. Justice Douglas stated, 
It must be remembered that the Congress was legislating about a Territory 
concerning which little was known. No report was available showing the nature 
and extent of any claims to the land. No Indian was present to point out his 
tribe’s domain. Therefore, Congress did the humane thing of saving to the 
Indians all rights claimed; it let them keep what they had prior to the new Act. 
Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 294. 
 132. Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 786, § 27, 31 Stat. 321, 330. 
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Rather, it clearly appears that what was intended was merely to 
retain the status quo until further congressional or judicial action 
was taken.133 
As he found that the title of the Tee-Hit-Ton had not been recognized, he 
denied their claim to compensation, leaving “with Congress, where it 
belongs, the policy of Indian gratuities for the termination of Indian 
occupancy of Government-owned land.”134  
IV. Justice Reed’s Role as New Deal Advocate 
and His View of the Role of the Courts 
So why did Justice Reed believe that decisions on whether compensation 
should be paid to the Indian nations for the taking of their lands belong with 
Congress rather than the courts? Why should they be treated any differently 
than non-Indian Americans who are constitutionally entitled to just 
compensation? One explanation, of course, is racial prejudice—the 
language Reed used in his judgments dealing with Indians reveals that he 
did not regard them as equal to non-Indian American citizens.135 He also 
appears to have been of the opinion that small groups of Indians should not 
be accorded extensive legal rights. In Tee-Hit-Ton, he noted that “the Tee-
Hit-Tons had become greatly reduced in numbers,” with “only a few 
women of childbearing age and a total membership of some 65.”136 What, 
one might ask, was the relevance of this observation, if not to suggest that it 
would be inappropriate to accord extensive property rights to a small, 
                                                                                                                 
 133. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 278. 
 134. Id. at 291. Here and elsewhere in his judgment Reed tightened the language between 
the first and second drafts of his judgment so as to diminish the status of Indian rights, in this 
instance by replacing the original words “for taking of Indian title” (which must have 
sounded too proprietary to him) with the final wording, “for the termination of Indian 
occupancy of Government-owned land.” See draft judgments in Reed Collection: Tee-Hit-
Ton Indians, supra note 9, at Box 159. 
 135. See WILLIAMS, supra note 23; see also supra text accompanying notes 38–41. 
 136. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 285–86; see also Nw. Bands of Shoshone Indians v. 
United States, 324 U.S. 335, 340 (1945) (Reed, J.) (“[P]etitioners here, the Northwestern 
bands, were at the time of the treaty a part of the Shoshone tribe, a nomadic Indian nation of 
less than ten thousand people which roamed over eighty million acres of prairie, forest and 
mountain in the present states of Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, Idaho and Nevada. The group 
with which we are concerned was comprised of some fifteen or eighteen hundred persons 
and claimed, by the treaty, Indian title to some ten million acres and now claim 
compensation for over six million additional acres.”). 
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diminishing group of Indians?137 This attitude was revealed as well when 
Reed, in his response to Justice Douglas’s comments on Reed’s draft 
judgment in Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., wrote that the opinion he had 
written “is best for the Indians. If the Indians were given a monopoly of a 
three million dollar a year fishery like the Karluk and if this Court did not 
decide that the reservation was temporary, it would be too much to give the 
Indians.”138 This is another way in which monetary considerations 
influenced Reed’s decisions, as we have seen took place in Tee-Hit-Ton 
when he used the potential cost to the United States treasury of 
compensating Indian nations for takings of original Indian title to get 
Justice Black, and possibly other judges, to support his judgment.139 
But I think there is a deeper explanation, going back to when, as 
Solicitor General, Reed argued the constitutionality of President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation before the Supreme Court in the mid-
1930s. This experience probably influenced his political philosophy on the 
proper role of the judiciary.140 President Roosevelt appointed Reed to serve 
as Solicitor General in March of 1935.141 Among the major cases he argued 
                                                                                                                 
 137. See Singer, supra note 1, at 249 (suggesting that this observation was relevant for 
Reed because “it triggers the story of the ‘vanishing Indian’ – it suggests to the reader that 
the land is mostly vacant.”). 
 138. Stanley Reed to William O. Douglas (Feb. 1, 1949), in Reed Collection: Hynes, 
supra note 121, at Box 118, quoted in MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 280. This was in response 
to Douglas’s memorandum quoted in supra note 121. See also the quotation from Tee-Hit-
Ton in supra note 125, where Reed noted that the Karluk Indian population for whom the 
reservation had been created consisted of only fifty-seven eligible voters. But as Mitchell 
points out, the question of whether a fishing monopoly should be granted in reserve waters 
was a policy question that should have been “irrelevant to the task of discerning the intent of 
Congress embodied in the two statutes that deciding the case required Reed to construe.” 
MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 280. 
 139. See supra text accompanying note 49. See also a hand-written note from Justice 
Burton to Justice Reed, dated January 24, in obvious reference to the draft judgment in Tee-
Hit-Ton that Reed had circulated, where Burton wrote: “I agree. This adds an appropriate 
sequel to your dissent in the first Tillamook case, in which dissent I am now doubly glad I 
joined you.” Reed Collection: Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, supra note 9, at Box 159. 
 140. For discussion of Reed’s role in the Roosevelt administration, see FASSETT, supra 
note 52, at 45–195. Before becoming Solicitor General, Reed had served as general counsel 
in the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, where he first began to appear before the 
Supreme Court defending President Roosevelt’s economic reforms. Fassett remarks that 
Reed “enlisted in FDR’s New Deal crusade.” Id. at 102. 
 141. Herman Pritchett observed, 
At a time when the American business and professional class still largely 
thought that the best government was the least government and regarded ‘that 
man in the White House’ as a wild-eyed radical, it was most important that the 
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and lost were Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,142 United States v. 
Butler,143 and Carter v. Carter Coal Co.144 In Carter, the legislation in 
question was struck down because, among other reasons, it was found to 
violate the Fifth Amendment protection of property rights.145 Reed thus had 
direct personal experience of how that constitutional provision could be 
judicially interpreted and applied to impede progressive governmental 
initiatives aimed at regulating the economy and furthering social and 
financial goals that he supported as vital to deal with the crisis brought on 
by the Great Depression.146 
Roosevelt was so disturbed by the Supreme Court's opposition to his 
New Deal reforms that he proposed a congressional bill that would have 
enabled him to enlarge the Court, permitting him to “pack the Court” with 
more sympathetic judges.147 That ill-fated plan died in Congress, but the 
Court apparently got the message and adopted a more conciliatory approach 
                                                                                                                 
case for equipping the government with adequate powers for economic control 
and social welfare should be stated by a man with the soberly conservative 
instincts of Stanley Reed. 
C. Herman Pritchett, Stanley Reed, in 3 JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 
THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 207, 218 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 4th ed. 
2013). 
 142. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 143. 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
 144. 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
 145. Id. at 311; see also Louisville Joint Stock Land Band v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 602 
(1935) (striking down the Frazier-Lemke Farm Bankruptcy Act of 1934 that had been 
enacted to protect farmers from mortgage foreclosures). The Court unanimously held that 
the Act deprived mortgagees of their property rights in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s 
prohibition against the taking of private property without just compensation. Id. Although 
Reed was not directly involved in the case, he would undoubtedly have followed it closely 
because it was argued and decided just weeks after he became Solicitor General. 
 146. The dedication with which he presented the government’s position before the Court 
is illustrated by an incident that occurred when he was arguing Moor v. Texas & New 
Orleans Railroad Co., 297 U.S. 101 (1936). After fielding a barrage of questions from the 
judges, Reed suddenly paled and told the Court he was unable to continue. The Court 
adjourned and Reed had to be helped from the courtroom. According to an article in the New 
York Times, “Court officers and representatives of the Department of Justice explained that 
the Solicitor General was suffering from extreme weakness caused by the strain of the major 
cases he had prepared and argued.” FASSETT, supra note 52, at 111 (quoting Reed in 
Collapse; AAA Cases Halted, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1935, at 1). Further evidence of Reed’s 
support for the New Deal is provided by the fact that he actively campaigned for Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s re-election at the end of his first term in 1936. See id. at 131–36. 
 147. See FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE SUPREME COURT (Alfred Haines Cope & Fred 
Krinsky eds., rev. ed. 1969); FASSETT, supra note 52, at 147–83; ELY, supra note 22, at 126–
27. 
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towards economic reform.148 Soon after, in January 1938, Roosevelt 
rewarded Reed for his faithful support of the New Deal by appointing him 
to the Supreme Court.149 A front page article in the New York Times 
reporting the nomination provided this positive assessment: “Mr. Reed, 
while having liberal views and defending scores of administration measures 
before the highest court, is universally regarded in Washington as realistic 
rather than radical and as judicially minded toward all legislative 
ventures.”150  
Justice Reed has been described as “an economic liberal who was 
generally conservative on civil rights and liberties.”151 The most well-
known example of his civil rights conservatism occurred just a year before 
Tee-Hit-Ton when the Court considered Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka.152 In Brown, he planned to dissent but was finally persuaded to join 
the Court in ruling that separate public schools for black and white students 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the 
laws.153 William O. Douglas, who was a colleague of Reed’s on the Court 
for close to twenty years, said this about him in an autobiography of his 
own years on the Court: 
Reed was a liberal in the frame of reference of the social and 
business problems that had become FDR’s cause. Those 
problems, however, were soon to disappear and new ones would 
take their place. As civil rights cases emerged, Reed was usually 
on the side of the government, which in one way made him 
consistent. The difficulty with his approach was that civil rights 
are often specifically protected against government action, while 
“property” interests have few particularized guarantees against 
                                                                                                                 
 148. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nat’l Labor 
Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Cincinnati Soap Co. v. 
United States, 301 U.S. 308 (1937); Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337 (1937). 
 149. See David O’Brien, Reed, Stanley Forman, in OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 712, 712–13 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992) [hereinafter O’Brien, 
Reed]. Ely referred to Reed as one of the “ardent New Dealers” whom Roosevelt named to 
the Court, along with Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, and William O. Douglas, when more 
conservative justices retired in the late 1930s. ELY, supra note 22, at 128. 
 150. Stanley Reed Goes to Supreme Court; Known as Liberal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1938, 
at 1, quoted in FASSETT, supra note 52, at 198. 
 151. O’Brien, Reed, supra note 149, at 712. 
 152. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 153. See FASSETT, supra note 52, at 555–80; Stephen Ellmann, The Rule of Law and the 
Achievement of Unanimity in Brown, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 741 (2004–2005); WILLIAMS, 
supra note 23, at 91–95. 
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regulation. . . . Reed, as it developed, was one of the most 
reactionary judges to occupy the Bench in my time.154 
Douglas’s assessment that “Reed was usually on the side of the 
government” is confirmed by his record of civil liberties cases. In a book 
published the year after Reed retired from the Court in 1957, William 
O’Brien examined Reed’s voting record. O’Brien found that, in the years 
from 1946 to 1952, for example, he favored individual rights over 
government interference in only sixteen percent of cases, making him one 
of the most anti-liberal members of the Court.155 Regarding First 
Amendment cases involving religious freedom, O’Brien observed: “In these 
unanimous or nonunanimous decisions of the Court from 1939 to 1955, 
Reed upheld the claimed right of the individual only 29 per cent of the time. 
The Court’s majority rated considerably higher with a 59 percent.”156 
O’Brien cautioned, however, against attaching facile political labels to 
                                                                                                                 
 154. WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, 1939-1975: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF 
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 20–21 (1980) (emphasis added); see also id. at 243 (“FDR probably 
named him [to the Court] because he felt that Stanley Reed would never strike down New 
Deal legislation.”). On a personal note, Douglas added that Reed “was also the most gentle, 
the friendliest, the most warm-hearted individual one could meet.” Id. at 21. Regarding 
Indian rights, Douglas disapproved of Reed’s opinions. (Douglas dissented in Northwestern 
Bands of Shoshone, Hynes, and Tee-Hit-Ton, where Reed had written the majority 
judgments.) For Christmas in 1967, he sent Reed a 1928 book by Patrick E. Byrne, The 
Indian Warrior (I have been unable to locate a copy), that apparently praised Indian 
civilizations before European colonization, accompanied by this note: 
As I started reading Indian Warrior, I realized I must have got it by mistake. 
For as you know, the Indians never had a better friend. Who should have 
received it? Then it dawned on me – Stanley Reed, of course, who could 
doubtless use this lamp to light his way. Merry Christmas. 
THE DOUGLAS LETTERS: SELECTIONS FROM THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 
120 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1987); see also supra note 126 (quoting Justice Frankfurter’s 
memorandum to Reed). Douglas’s Indian law judgments are discussed in Ralph W. Johnson, 
“In Simple Justice to a Downtrodden People”: Justice Douglas and the American Indian 
Cases, in “HE SHALL NOT PASS THIS WAY AGAIN”: THE LEGACY OF JUSTICE WILLIAM O. 
DOUGLAS 191 (Stephen L. Wasby ed., 1990). 
 155. F. WILLIAM O’BRIEN, JUSTICE REED AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE RELIGION 
CLAUSES 197–202 (1958) [hereinafter O’BRIEN, JUSTICE REED]. O’Brien relied in part on 
Professor John Frank’s analyses of the Supreme Court records during these years. See, e.g., 
John P. Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1950-1951, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 223 
(1951) (“In matters of free speech, Reed is the hardest-hitting of the opponents of 
liberalism.”). 
 156. O’BRIEN, JUSTICE REED, supra note 155, at 202. However, O’Brien went on to 
question whether this “pro-individual, anti-government” formula is the best way to evaluate 
a justice’s “liberalism.” 
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Reed. He pointed out, for example, that while Reed was still Solicitor 
General, he successfully argued National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel.157 The Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act, 
which protected workers’ rights to organize and engage in collective 
bargaining.158 So perhaps the best way to understand Reed’s approach to 
judicial decision-making is to recognize that he was a proponent of judicial 
restraint in applying the Constitution to limit government powers.159 In 
most cases, he preferred to defer to congressional wisdom and uphold the 
constitutionality of government actions and legislation. During the New 
Deal era, this made him look like a liberal, whereas it made him look like a 
conservative when civil rights and liberties were at stake.160 Professor 
Herman Pritchett confirms this assessment: 
It is not easy to label Reed. He tended to be an economic liberal 
and a civil rights conservative. He believed in governmental 
power to regulate the economy and to protect labor’s position, 
but not to the extent [Justice] Black did. He believed in judicial 
restraint and deference to legislatures, but not to the extent that 
[Justice] Frankfurter did. He was more inclined than either to 
favor the government and public order against the claims of the 
individual in the various situations where such a confrontation 
was presented.161 
Pritchett identified two major themes in Reed’s judgments: “a belief in 
government and organization [and] judicial restraint. As a judge, he did not 
think he should dictate to the President or Congress. He accepted the 
Holmes weak-judiciary-strong-legislature formula.”162 
In addition to his support of Roosevelt’s New Deal in the 1930s, 
evidence of Justice Reed’s economic liberalism can be found in some of his 
public addresses. For example, in a speech entitled “Trends in Government” 
that he gave on October 14, 1944, to the Judicial Conference of the Sixth 
Circuit in Cincinnati, Ohio, he stated: 
                                                                                                                 
 157. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 158. O’BRIEN, JUSTICE REED, supra note 155, at 210. 
 159. Id. at 232–42. O’Brien observed, “In a number of public addresses given while he 
was Solicitor General, Reed advocated that the courts exercise restraint in striking down 
pieces of legislation passed by the elected representatives of the people.” Id. at 232; see also 
FASSETT, supra note 52, at 133–35. 
 160. See FASSETT, supra note 52, at 643–59, where numerous assessments of Reed’s 
judicial career support this conclusion. 
 161. Pritchett, supra note 141, at 217–18. 
 162. Id. at 218 (emphasis added). 
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The concept of economic freedom prevalent in days prior to the 
necessity for business regulation has left many persons with the 
conviction that freedom means the right of an employer, without 
statutory restraint, to hire and fire his employees, for any or no 
reason and to combine as he pleases with other producers to 
assure protection from cutthroat competition, a production 
attuned to demand and a fair price for the product. But unless a 
shift in sentiment takes place, the course of the law points 
towards greater participation of the employee in the affairs of 
industry and trade, and continuation of prohibitions against 
interference with free competition. 
 This legislation is restrictive of economic liberty if one 
defines such liberty to mean the right of the individual to 
conduct business without legislative control. Viewed 
realistically, however, much of recent governmental regulation 
has increased the economic freedom of the average citizen.163 
He went on to say that “[g]overnment may spend for social welfare,” which 
is why “we have government intervention to accelerate the achievement of 
the modern social needs of the people in many important phases.”164 
However, when it was a matter of defining the role of the courts in 
relation to non-economic issues, Justice Reed adopted a more conservative 
tone. Both before and after his retirement from the Supreme Court in 
February, 1957, he gave numerous speeches outlining his judicial 
philosophy and the appropriate balance of power between the legislative 
and judicial branches. In these, he frequently expressed his opposition to 
what he referred to privately as “krytocracy,” or government by judges.165 
One particular example, the content of which is similar to many of his 
public addresses, stands out because it was delivered just three days after he 
delivered the opinion in Tee-Hit-Ton. Speaking on February 10, 1955, to 
the Cincinnati Bar Association at a dinner commemorating the one 
hundredth anniversary of the establishment of the Southern District of Ohio 
                                                                                                                 
 163. Justice Stanley Reed, Address to the Judicial Conference of the Sixth Circuit in 
Cincinnati, Ohio: Trends in Government 6 (Oct. 14, 1944), in University of Kentucky, 
Margaret I. King Library, Special Collections, Stanley Forman Reed Collection, 81M3, Box 
221, Speech Series [hereinafter Reed Collection: Speech Series]. 
 164. Id. at 10. 
 165. See FASSETT, supra note 52, at x, 262, 567, 582, 611, 654; Ellmann, supra note 153, 
at 760, 765–80. 
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as a district of the United States Courts, in a speech entitled “The Courts 
and the Constitution,” he stated: 
Our courts must be meticulously careful not to overstep the 
limits of their powers. As courts are in a position to exceed their 
rightful authority they must be doubly careful to stay well within 
their allotted duties. In the United States the courts have been 
entrusted by the constitutions, the legislative bodies and the 
people with greater power than other nations have seen fit to 
grant or leave to others than legislative assemblies or monarchs. 
In consequence, it is incumbent upon our judiciary to restrain 
any inclination to exert those powers to achieve particular results 
merely because they are agreeable to the judges’ conceptions of 
proper economic or social arrangements.166  
From this speech, contemporaneous with the Tee-Hit-Ton decision, 
Justice Reed’s commitment to judicial restraint and his deference to the 
legislative branch in matters of policy are evident. In this light, it is perhaps 
                                                                                                                 
 166. Justice Stanley Reed, The Courts and the Constitution, 55 OHIO L. REP. 200, 202–03 
(1955). In addition to this published speech, see Justice Stanley Reed, Address Before the 
Opening Session of the Twenty-sixth Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute, 
Washington, D.C. (May 18, 1949), in Reed Collection: Speech Series, supra note 163, at 
Box 221; Justice Stanley Reed, Address Before the Juristic Society, Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania: A Constitutional Philosophy (Feb. 16, 1950), in Reed Collection: Speech 
Series, supra note 163, at Box 221; Justice Stanley Reed, Address Before the Kentucky Bar 
Association, Lexington, Kentucky: Our Constitutional Philosophy: Concerning the 
Significance of Judicial Review in the Evolution of American Democracy (Apr. 4, 1957), in 
Reed Collection: Speech Series, supra note 163, at Box 223. Reed’s shift from economic 
liberalism to a more conservative approach to civil rights is revealed in Justice Stanley Reed, 
Address to the Thirteenth Annual Conference of the Federal Judges of the Sixth Judicial 
Circuit, Detroit, Michigan: A Constitutional Philosophy 8 (Apr. 18, 1952), in Reed 
Collection: Speech Series, supra note 163, at Box 222, where he implied none too subtly that 
some judges are soft on crime and subversion (this was at the height of McCarthyism): 
During the ’30s there was strong support among liberal elements for a 
construction [of the Constitution] that would allow the Nation to make 
adjustments in finances, labor organization legislation, hours and wages, and 
regulation of investments. In recent years, there has been a shift in viewpoint. 
Many who advocated liberalism in property control, uphold strict construction 
in civil rights. Government must treat religion as though it did not exist. Speech 
must be so free that incitement to subversion cannot be punished. Those 
charged with committing crime almost seem to receive more consideration that 
the law-abiding group. As between the extremists of either view, the courts 
must fairly hold the scales. 
Id. 
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easier to understand his position on Indian land rights. Recall what he said 
at the very end of his judgment in the Tee-Hit-Ton case: “Our conclusion 
does not uphold harshness as against tenderness toward the Indians, but it 
leaves with Congress, where it belongs, the policy of Indian gratuities for 
the termination of Indian occupancy of Government-owned land rather than 
making compensation for its value a rigid constitutional principle.”167 
This deference to Congress was at least partly the result of his experience 
as Solicitor General, resulting in a bias in favor of the government, which 
was observable throughout his judicial career up until his retirement from 
the Bench in 1957. However, the fact remains that he did not base his 
conclusion that the policy of paying Indians for their lands rests with 
Congress on legal precedent or principle. The judgment itself, along with 
Reed’s memorandum to Justice Black expressing his fears of what a 
contrary decision might cost the government, reveal that his deference to 
Congress in this case was driven more by his own attitudes towards Indians 
and financial concerns than by law. This is true despite what he said in his 
speech to the Cincinnati Bar Association about judges not making decisions 
based on their own conceptions of proper economic or social arrangements. 
V. Conclusion 
It needs to be acknowledged that, although Justice Reed wrote the 
judgment in the Tee-Hit-Ton case, his opinion was supported by the four 
other judges who joined him.168 Even the dissenting judges did not disagree 
that recognition was necessary for the taking of Indian title to be 
compensable. Perhaps their hands were tied by Reed’s footnote in Hynes 
where he had disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Miller that “the 
Indian right of occupancy of Alaska lands is compensable.”169 This 
explanation would be consistent with Justice Frankfurter’s observation in 
his marginal note on the draft of Reed’s Tee-Hit-Ton judgment that he 
(Frankfurter) might have been negligent in not requesting the deletion of 
that footnote in Hynes.170 And, after Hynes came Tillamooks II, where the 
full Court refused to grant the interest that would have been payable on 
                                                                                                                 
 167. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 290–91 (1955) (emphasis 
added). 
 168. Justice Robert Jackson died in office on October 9, 1954, before Tee-Hit-Ton was 
argued, and was replaced by Justice John Harlan on March 17, 1955, after the case was 
decided. Thus, the case was decided by a margin of 5–3. 
 169. Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86, 106 n.28 (1949). See supra note 123 and 
accompanying text. 
 170. See supra text accompanying notes 125–26. 
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compensation for the taking of Indian title if it were under the Fifth 
Amendment. Nonetheless, examination of the major Indian rights cases 
decided by the Supreme Court through the 1940s to the Tee-Hit-Ton 
decision reveals the growing influence of Reed’s views, in particular, his 
insistence that the distinction between recognized and unrecognized Indian 
title could be used to deny Fifth Amendment protection to original Indian 
title. He likely not only carried the weight of his New Deal battles from the 
1930s with him to the Supreme Court, but eventually was able to convince 
the other members of the Court that they should leave the matter of 
compensation for the taking of Indian lands with Congress. But to achieve 
this goal he ignored some earlier precedents and twisted others in order to 
relegate Indian title to a non-proprietary right of occupancy. It is ironic that 
a man who had argued passionately in favor of legislation to assist the 
economically disadvantaged in the 1930s would go on to pen a decision in 
the 1950s that undercut the property rights of the Indian nations, whose 
members are all too often among the poorest of America’s poor.171 Given 
the extent to which the Tee-Hit-Ton decision was driven by the experience, 
attitudes, and political views of one man, rather than by legal principle and 
precedent, the ruling that original Indian title is not a compensable property 
right under the Fifth Amendment should be reconsidered by the Supreme 
Court at the earliest opportunity.172 
                                                                                                                 
 171. See the quotation from Justice Frankfurter’s January 27, 1949 memorandum to 
Justice Reed quoted in supra note 126. On the impact of the Tee-Hit-Ton decision on Indian 
rights, see Newton, supra note 11, at 1253–84; Haycox, supra note 1, at 141–43; MITCHELL, 
supra note 1, at 357–58; LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 43, at 136–39; COHEN’S HANDBOOK, 
supra note 42, § 15.09[1][d][i], at 1054–56. In spite of the Court’s negative decision, a 
political compromise on Indigenous land rights in Alaska was implemented when Congress 
enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971). See 
THOMAS R. BERGER, VILLAGE JOURNEY: THE REPORT OF THE ALASKA NATIVE REVIEW 
COMMISSION (1985); MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 10–14, 380–86; COHEN’S HANDBOOK, 
supra note 42, § 4.07[3], at 326–56. 
 172. Accord Newton, supra note 11, at 1285–85. The Supreme Court is not averse to 
changing its mind and overruling its own decisions when justice so requires, especially when 
constitutional provisions are concerned. Justice Reed himself participated in just such a 
change in the law when he signed on to the majority decision in Brown, which overruled the 
“separate but equal” doctrine for public schools that had been established in Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). And he delivered the opinion in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 
649 (1944), explicitly overruling the Court’s decision just nine years earlier in Grovey v. 
Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935), which had held that the Constitution does not apply to 
political party primaries. In Smith, Reed stated: 
[W]hen convinced of former error, this Court has never felt constrained to 
follow precedent. In constitutional questions, where correction depends upon 
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amendment and not upon legislative action this Court throughout its history has 
freely exercised its power to reexamine the basis of its constitutional decisions. 
This has long been accepted practice, and this practice has continued to this 
day. This is particularly true when the decision believed erroneous is the 
application of a constitutional principle, rather than an interpretation of the 
Constitution to extract the principle itself. 
Smith, 321 U.S. at 665–66 (footnotes omitted). Notably, while still contemplating a dissent 
in Brown, he asked his law clerk to update the long list of cases where the Court had 
overruled its prior decisions in footnote 10 of his judgment in Smith v. Allwright. See 
FASSETT, supra note 52, at 567. Until Tee-Hit-Ton is overruled, lower courts will continue to 
follow it, as did the court in Karuk Tribe of California v. Ammon, 209 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 
2000). See also United States v. Gemmill, 535 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1976); State v. Elliott, 
616 A.2d 210, 213 (S.C. Vt. 1992). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol44/iss1/2
